Abstract. Access control systems must be evaluated in part on how well they support the Principle of Least Authority (POLA), i.e., how well they enable the distribution of appropriate access rights needed for cooperation, while simultaneously limiting the inappropriate proliferation of access rights which would create vulnerabilities. POLA may be practiced by arrangement of permissions and by abstraction of access. To date, access control systems have been evaluated only by their effectiveness at POLA-by-arrangement.
Introduction
We live in a world of insecure computing. Viruses regularly roam our networks causing substantial damage. By exploiting a single bug in an ordinary server or application, an attacker is able to compromise a whole system. Bugs scale linearly with code size, so vulnerability usually increases over the life of a given software system. Lacking a readily available solution, users have turned to the perpetual stopgaps of virus checkers and firewalls. These stopgaps do not offer any viable long-term solution: they fail to provide the defender with any fundamental advantage over the attacker.
In large measure, these problems are failures of access control. All widely-deployed operating systems today-including Windows, UNIX variants, Macintosh, and PalmOS-routinely allow programs to execute with dangerously excessive and largely unnecessary authority. For example, when you run Solitaire, it needs only to render into its window, receive UI events, and perhaps save a game state to a file you specify. Under the Principle of Least Authority (POLA-closely related to the Princi-To understand how object-capability practitioners build abstractions to solve these problems, we show how simple and tractable programs can be used to bound the authority available to arbitrarily complex, unanalyzed, and potentially hostile programs. In the process, we show that many policies that have been "proven" impossible are in fact straightforward.
The balance of this paper proceeds as follows. In "Terminology and Distinctions" we explain our distinction between permission and authority, adapted from the takegrant distinction between de jure and de facto transfer. In "How Much Authority Does 'cp' Need?", we use a pair of Unix shell examples to illuminate the stark contrast between ACLs and object-capabilities. In "The Object-Capability Paradigm", we explain the relationship between the object-capability paradigm and the object paradigm. We introduce the object-capability language E which we use to show access control abstractions. In "Confinement" we show how object-capability systems confine programs rather than uncontrolled subjects. We show how confinement enables a further pattern of abstraction, which we use to implement the *-properties.
Terminology and Distinctions
For the following discussion, we say a direct access right to an object gives permission to a subject to invoke the behavior of that object. Here, Alice has direct access to /etc/passwd, so she has permission to invoke any of its operations. She accesses the object, invoking its read() operation. By subject we mean the finest grain unit of computation on a given system that may be given distinct access rights. Depending on the system, this could be anything from: all processes run by a given user account, all processes running a given program, an individual process, all instances of a given class, or an individual instance. To encourage anthropomorphism we use human names for subjects.
By object, we mean the finest grained unit to which separate access rights may be provided, such as a file, a memory page, or another subject, depending on the system. Without loss of generality, we model restricted access to an object, such as read-only access to /etc/passwd, as simple access to another object whose behavior embodies the restriction, such as access to the read-only facet of /etc/passwd which responds only to queries.
Any discussion of access must carefully distinguish between direct and indirect access (adapted from Bishop and Snyder's distinction between de jure and de facto transfer [Bishop79] ). Alice can directly read /etc/passwd by calling read(…) when the system's protection state says she has adequate permission. Bob (unshown), who does not have permission, can read /etc/passwd so long as Alice sends him copies of the text. When Alice and Bob arrange this relying only on the "legal" overt rules of the system, we say Alice is providing Bob with an indirect access right to read /etc/passwd, that she is acting as his proxy, and that Bob thereby has authority to read it. Bob's authority derives from the arrangement of permissions (Alice's read permission, Alice's permission to talk to Bob), and from the behavior of subjects and objects on permitted causal pathways (Alice's proxying behavior). The thin black arrows in our access diagrams depict permissions. We will explain the resulting authority relationships in the text.
The protection state of a system is the arrangement of permissions at some instant in time, i.e., the topology of the access graph. Whether Bob currently has permission to access /etc/passwd depends only on the current arrangements of permissions. Whether Bob eventually gains permission depends on this arrangement and on the state and behavior of all subjects and objects that might cause Bob to be granted permission. We can't generally predict if Bob will gain this permission, but our safety may demand that we ensure he cannot.
From a given system's update rules-rules governing permission to alter permissions-one might be able to calculate a bound on possible future arrangements by reasoning only from the current arrangement. 2 This corresponds to Bishop and Snyder's potential de jure analysis, and gives us an arrangement-only bound on permission. With more knowledge, one can set tighter bounds. When the state and behavior of some subjects and objects are also taken into account, we have a tighter partially behavioral bound on permission.
Bob's eventual authority to /etc/passwd depends on the arrangement of permissions, and on the state and behavior of all objects on permitted causal pathways between Bob and /etc/passwd. One can derive a bound on possible overt causality by reasoning only from the current arrangement of permissions. This corresponds to Bishop and Snyder's potential de facto analysis, and gives us an arrangement-only bound on authority. Likewise, if we take some state and behavior into account, we have a tighter partially behavioral bound on authority.
Systems have many levels of abstraction. At any moment our frame of reference is a boundary between a base system that imposes rules vs. the subjects hosted on that base, restricted by those rules. By definition, the operators of a base access control system can only manipulate permissions. When subjects extend the expressiveness of a system by abstraction, authority serves as virtual permission. Only by understanding the behavior of an abstraction can we see how it further tightens bounds on authority. As we ascend layers of abstraction, as the extensions of one layer become the implementation of the next higher, the boundary between permission and authority shifts accordingly. Permission is relative to a frame of reference. Authority is invariant.
It is unclear whether Saltzer and Schroeder's Principle of Least Privilege is best interpreted as least permission or least authority. As we will see, there is an enormous difference between the two.
3.
How Much Authority Does "cp" Need?
Consider how the following shell command works:
Here, your shell passes to the cp program the two strings "foo.txt" and "bar.txt". By these strings, you mean particular objects (files) in your namespace. In order for cp to do its job, it must use your namespace, and must be able to read and write any file you might name that you can read and write. Not only does it operate with all your authority, it must. Given this ACL-oriented way of using names, its least authority would still include all of your authority to the file system. So long as we install and run normal applications in this manner, both security and reliability are hopeless.
By contrast, consider
This shell command brings about the same end effect. Although cat also runs with all your authority, for this example at least, it does not need to. As with function calls in any lexically scoped language (even FORTRAN), the names used to designate arguments are evaluated in the caller's namespace prior to the call (here, by opening files). The callee gets direct access to the first-class anonymous objects passed in, and designates them with parameter "names" bound in its own private name space (here, file descriptor numbers). In this case, the two open files passed in are all the least authority needed to perform this request. If cat ran as a separate subject with only these authorities, it could still do its job, and we could more easily reason about our possible vulnerabilities to its malice or bugs. In our experience of object-capability programming, these radical reductions of authority and vulnerability mostly happen naturally.
The Object-Capability Paradigm
In the pure object model of computation [Goldberg76, Hewitt73] , there is no distinction between subjects and objects. A non-primitive object is an encapsulated combination of code and state, where the state is an addressable and mutable collection of references to objects. A reference provides access to an object, indivisibly combining designation of the object, the right to access it, and the means to access it. Depending on the system, an address may be an instance variable name or index, a memory address, or a capability-list index (a c-list index, like a file descriptor number). The computational system is the dynamic access graph of objects held together by these references. Within the limits set by the access graph, objects, behaving according to their code, interact only by sending messages carrying an addressable collection of arguments (e.g., by argument position), thereby changing the access graph. The object-capability model of secure computation recognizes the security inherent in the object model. To get from objects to object-capabilities, we need merely prohibit certain primitive abilities which are not part of the object model anyway, but which the object model by itself doesn't require us to prohibit (like forged pointers, direct access to another's private state, mutable static state) [Kahn88, Rees96, Miller00] . For example, C++, with its ability to cast integers into pointers, is still within the object model but not the object-capability model.
Model
Whereas the functionality of an object program depends only on the abilities provided by its underlying system, the security of an object-capability program depends on underlying inabilities as well. In a graph of mutually suspicious objects, one object's correctness depends not only on what the rules of the game say it can do, but also on what the rules say its potential adversaries cannot do.
The Object-Capability Model
The following model is an idealization of various object languages and object-capability operating systems. All its powers of access control are present in DVH. 3 In the initial conditions of Figure 2 , Alice's state includes references to Bob and Carol-Bob and Carol are directly accessible from Alice.
Alice causes an effect on the world outside herself only by sending messages to objects directly accessible to her (such as Bob), where she may include, at distinct argument addresses, references to any objects accessible to her (such as Carol). A call-return pattern consists of two messages. For example, Alice gains information from Bob by causing Bob (with a query) to cause her to be informed (with a return).
Bob is affected by the world outside himself only by the arrival of messages sent by those with access to him. On arrival, the arguments of the message (Carol) also become accessible to Bob. Within the limits set by these rules, and by what Bob may 3 The object-capability model is essentially the untyped lambda calculus with local side effects (the model Scheme is based on), where a message send applies an object-as-closure to a message-as-argument. This three-way correspondence of objects, lambda calculus, and capabilities was noticed several times by 1973 [Goldberg76, Hewitt73, Morris73] , and investigated explicitly in [Rees96] . feasibly know or compute, Bob's reaction to an incoming message is only according to his code (see below). All computation happens only in response to messages. We distinguish three kinds of primitive objects.
• Immutable data objects, such as the number 3. Access to these are knowledge limited rather than permission limited. If Alice can figure out which integer she wants, whether 3 or your private key, she can have it. We refer to immutable data objects collectively as bits, as they provide only information, no access. Because data is immutable, we need not distinguish between a reference to data and the data itself. A reference to non-data is a capability.
• Devices. For purposes of analysis we divide the world into a computational system containing all objects of potential interest, and an external world. On the boundary are primitive devices, causally connected to the external world by unexplained means. A non-device object can only affect the external world by sending a message to an accessible output device. A non-device object can only be affected by the external world by receiving a message from an input device that has access to it.
• Creator. We assume universal access to an object creation service, which any object can invoke with code and state to create a new object. The creator accepts only immutable bits as code, or alternatively, it makes a private bits-only copy for use as the new object's code. Code uses an address to indicate which accessible reference to use, or where in its state to store an accessible reference. The state is a mutable map from addresses to references. The new object is an instance of its code. The creator returns the only reference to the new object.
(Below, we explain nested lambda evaluation as built from use of the creator.) By these rules, only connectivity begets connectivity-all access relationships must derive from previous access relationships. Two disjoint subgraphs cannot become connected as no one can introduce them. Arrangement-based analysis of permission bounds proceeds by graph reachability arguments. Overt causation, carried only by messages, may flow only along permitted pathways. We may again use reachability arguments to reason about authority bounds, i.e., overt causality. The transparency of garbage collection relies on such arguments.
4.2.
A Taste of E E is a simple object-capability language in which objects are closures instantiated by lambda evaluation. We use only a subset of E providing functionality present in DVH. This has the semantics of lambda calculus with local side effects, much like Scheme [Kelsey98] , combined with syntactic support for message sending and method dispatch. Here is a simple data abstraction.
def pointMaker { to make(x,y) :any { def point { to getX() :any { x } to getY() :any { y } to add(otherPt) :any { pointMaker.make(x.add(otherPt.getX()), y.add(otherPt.getY())) } } } }
This defines an object, pointMaker, used to make new points. The keyword "to" is used to define its single method, make, that, when invoked, defines and returns a new point. (The ":any" vs. ":void" on a method declares whether it returns a value.) The code for point uses x and y freely. These are its instance variables, and together form its state. The state maps from addresses "x" and "y" to the associated values from point's creation context. This example defines a polymorphic abstract data type-points respond to the same add message used to add integers.
Given the universal creator specified above, we could transform the above code to def pointMaker { to make(x,y) :any { def point := creator.create("def point {…}", ["x" => x, "y" => y]) } } (The expression ["x" => x, "y" => y] builds a map (hashtable) of key => value associations.)
Applying this transformation recursively would unnest all lambda expressions. Nested lambda evaluation better explains instantiation in object languages. The creator better explains process or domain creation in object-capability OSes. In E, we almost always use lambda, but we use the creator below to achieve confinement.
Revocation: Redell's 1974 Caretaker Pattern
When Alice says bob.foo(carol), she is giving Bob unconditional, full, and perpetual access to Carol. 4 Given the purpose of Alice's message to Bob, such access may dangerously exceed least authority. In order to practice POLA, Alice might need to somehow restrict the rights she grants to Bob. For example, she might ensure she can revoke access at a later time. But in a capability system, capabilities themselves are the only representation of permission, and they provide only unconditional, full, perpetual access to the object they designate.
What The Caretaker just transparently forwards the message to target's current value. The Revoker changes what that current value is. Alice can revoke the effect of her earlier grant to Bob by saying "carol2Rvkr.revoke()".
Variables in E are final by default. var simply means that target is non-final, it can be assigned to. Within the scope of target's definition, make defines two objects, caretaker and revoker, and returns both of these to its caller in a two element list. Alice receives this pair, defines carol2 to be the new Caretaker, and defines carol2Rvkr to be the corresponding Revoker. Both objects use target freely, so they both share access to the same assignable target variable (which is therefore a separate object).
What happens when Bob invokes carol2, thinking he's invoking the kind of thing Carol is? An object definition contains "to" clauses defining methods and an optional "match" clause defining a matcher. If an incoming message (x.add(3)) doesn't match any of the methods, it is given to the matcher. The verb parameter is bound to the message name ("add") and the args to the argument list ([3] ). This allows messages to be received generically without prior knowledge of their API (much like Smalltalk's doesNotUnderstand: or Java's Proxy). E.call(…) allows messages to be sent generically (like Smalltalk's perform: or Java's "reflection"). 5 The Caretaker itself provides a temporal restriction of authority. Similar patterns provide other restrictions, such as filtering facets that let only certain messages through. Even in systems not designed to support access abstraction, many simple patterns happen naturally. Under Unix, Alice might run a filtering facet as a process reading a socket Bob can write. The facet process would access Carol using Alice's permissions.
Analysis and Blind Spots
Given Redell's existence proof in 1974, what are we to make of subsequent arguments that revocation is infeasible in capability systems? Of those who made this im-possibility claim, as far as we are aware, none pointed to a flaw in Redell's reasoning. The key is the difference between permission and authority analysis. ([Chander01] analyzes, in our terms, only permission.) By such an analysis, Bob was never given permission to access Carol, so there was no access to Carol to be revoked! Bob was given permission to access carol2, and he still has it. No permissions were revoked.
A security officer investigating an incident needs to know who has access to a compromised object.
-Karger and Herbert [Karger84] In their paper, Karger and Herbert propose to give a security officer a list of all subjects who are, in our terms, permitted to access Carol. This list will not include Bob's access to Carol, since this indirect access is represented only by the system's protection state taken together with the behavior of objects playing by the rules. Within their system, Alice, by restricting the authority given to Bob as she should, has inadvertently thwarted the security officer's ability to get a meaningful answer to his query.
To render a permission-only analysis useless, a threat model need not include either malice or accident; it need only include subjects following security best practices.
An arrangement-only bound on permission would include the possibility of the Caretaker giving Bob direct access to Carol-precisely what the Caretaker was constructed not to do. Only by reasoning about behaviors can Alice see that the Caretaker is a "smart reference". Just as pointMaker extends our vocabulary of data types, raising the abstraction level at which we express solutions, so does the Caretaker extend our vocabulary for expressing access control. Alice (or her programmer) should use arrangement-only analysis for reasoning about what potential adversaries may do. But Alice also interacts with many objects, like the Caretaker, because she has some confidence she understands their actual behavior.
The Object-Capability Paradigm
The object-capability model does not describe access control as a separate concern, to be bolted on to computation organized by other means. Rather it is a model of modular computation with no separate access control mechanisms. All its support for access control is well enough motivated by the pursuit of abstraction and modularity. Parnas' principle of information hiding [Parnas72] in effect says our abstractions should hand out information only on a need to know basis. POLA simply adds that authority should be handed out only on a need to do basis. Modularity and security each require both of these principles.
The Once upon a time, in the days before wireless, you (the customer) could buy a calculator (the service) from a manufacturer you might not trust. Although you might worry whether the calculations are correct, you can at least enter your financial data confident that the calculator can't leak your secrets back to its manufacturer. How did the calculator solve the confinement problem? By letting you see that no strings were attached. In a world where the only causation of concern would be carried by wires, the visible absence of wires emerging from the box-the isolation of the subgraphis adequate evidence of confinement. (Wires within the box are of no concern.) Here, we use this same technique to achieve confinement, substituting capabilities for wires. The presentation here is a working simplification of confinement in actual object-capability systems [Hardy86, Shapiro99, Shapiro00, Wagner02, Yee03] .
To solve confinement, assume that the manufacturer and customer have mutual access to a (Factory, factoryMaker) pair created by the following code, and assume that the customer trusts that this pair of objects behaves according to this code. 6 Using the factoryMaker, the manufacturer puts his proprietary calculator program in an impenetrable shell and sends it to the customer.
{ interface
def calculatorFactory := factoryMaker.make("…code…") customer.acceptProduct(calculatorFactory)
The customer uses a ":Factory" declaration to ensure that the product she receives has no external wires. She then uses it to make as many live calculators as she wants. Each has only that access beyond themselves that the customer provides, so they can't even talk to each other unless the customer allows them to, as shown in the next example. (The customer does not care about access relationships ("wires") within the calculator-that's the calculator's business.)
With lambda evaluation, a new subject's code and state both come from the same parent. To solve the confinement problem, we need to combine code (including immutable data) from the manufacturer with state from the customer to give birth to a new calculator, and to enable the customer to verify that she is the only state-providing parent. This state is an example of Lampson's "controlled environment".
7 By participating in the instantiation of the calculator, the customer has special knowledge of what other access rights the calculator does not have. We say the calculator is a controlled subject to her-one born into an environment controlled by her. By contrast, should the manufacturer introduce the customer to an already instantiated calculation service, the customer would not be able to tell whether it has strings attached. (Extending our analogy, suppose the manufacturer offers a calculation service from his web site.) The calculation service would be an uncontrolled subject to her.
We wish to reiterate that by "confinement" we refer to the overt subset of Lampson's problem, where the customer accepts only code ("a program") from the manufacturer and instantiates it in a controlled environment. The customer creates, in our terms, a controlled subject, whose authority she confines.
A Non-Discretionary Model
Our confinement logic depends on the non-discretionary nature of object-capabilities.
"Our discussion … rested on an unstated assumption: the principal that creates a file or other object in a computer system has unquestioned authority to authorize access to it by other principals. … We may characterize this control pattern as discretionary." [emphasis in the original] -Saltzer and Schroeder [Saltzer75]
Object-capability systems have no principals. A human user, together with his shell and "home directory" of references, participates, in effect, as just another subject. With the substitution of "subject" for "principal", we will use this classic definition of "discretionary".
By this definition, object-capabilities are not discretionary. In our model, in DVH, and in most actual capability system implementations, even if Alice creates Carol, Alice may still only authorize Bob to access Carol if Alice has authority to access Bob. Without this constraint, our confinement logic would not work.
The *-Properties
To illustrate the power of confinement, we use it to enforce the *-properties.
Boebert made clear in [[Boebert84]] that an unmodified or classic capability system cannot enforce the *-property or solve the confinement problem.
The main pitfall of a classic capability system is that "the right to exercise access carries with it the right to grant access".
Briefly, the *-properties taken together allow subjects with lower (such as "secret") clearance to communicate to subjects with higher (such as "top secret") clearance, but prohibit communication in the reverse direction [Bell74] . KeySafe is a concrete and realistic design for a system providing *-properties, etc., that was to be implemented on KeyKOS, a pure object-capability system [Rajunas89] . However, claims that capabilities cannot enforce the *-properties continue [Gong89, Kain87, Wallach97, Saraswat03], citing [Boebert84] as their support for this claim. Recently, referring to [Boebert84] , Boebert writes:
The paper in question was, and remains, no more than an offhand remark. … The historical significance of the paper is that it prompted the writing of
Boebert here defers to Kain and Landwehr's paper [Kain87] . Regarding object-capability systems, Kain and Landwehr's paper makes essentially the same impossibility claims, which they support only by citing and summarizing Boebert. To lay this matter to rest, we see no choice but to accept Boebert's challenge problem.
Here is the method our customer uses to accept the calculator product from the manufacturer. Our customer creates two calculators, Q and Bond, that she might consider to have secret and top secret clearance, respectively. She builds a data diode by defining a diodeWriter, a diodeReader, and an assignable diode variable they share. She gives Q and Bond access to each other only through the data diode. An arrangementonly bound on permissions or authority supports Boebert's case-the data diode might introduce Q and Bond. By examining its behavior we see the tighter bounds it was built to enforce. We see it transmits bits (here, integers) in only one direction and capabilities in neither. (Q cannot even read what he just wrote!) With these tools, one can easily implement the *-properties, and prevent Boebert's attack. The right to exercise access to the data diode does not carry with it the right to grant access. (See [Miller03] for further details.) 8 By using confinement, our customer can enforce policies, like the *-properties, that depend on the participants having no external communications channels beyond those enabled by the customer.
A Partitioned Model
Our ability to enforce the *-properties depends on the partitioned nature of objectcapabilities. Above, Q may communicate any bits he knows to Bond-he may share all his knowledge with Bond-but he is unable to share any of his permissions with Bond. In object-capability systems including DVH, bits and permissions are partitioned. Because Bond and Q cannot create a causal pathway from Bond to Q, Q is severely limited in his ability to proxy for Bond, and therefore in his ability to share even his authority with Bond. By contrast, in a pure password capability system like Amoeba [Tanenbaum86] , a capability is just a bit string-permission is obtained merely by demonstrating knowledge of secrets. 9 In a pure password capability system, it is indeed impossible to both allow Q to communicate to Bond while preventing Q from sharing his permissions with Bond.
The Arena and Terms of Entry
Policies like the *-properties are generally assumed to govern a computer system as a whole, to be enforced in collaboration with a human sys-admin or security officer. In a capability system, this is a matter of initial conditions. If the owner of the system wishes such a policy to govern the entire system, she can run such code when the system is first generated, and when new users join. But what happens after the big 8 DVH and many other capability systems provide primitive data-read-only capabilities, enabling them to solve Boebert's problem only by arranging permissions. By using abstraction instead, our example presents a pattern that can be adapted to express more complex policies. 9 By our classification, the Monash system is a semi-partitioned semi-password capability system [Anderson86] .
Since a capability is just a bit string, it can propagate in many ways without the detection of the kernel or the server … -Gong [Gong89] bang? Let's say Alice meets Bob, who is an uncontrolled subject to her. Alice can still enforce "additive" policies on Bob, e.g., she can give him revocable access to Carol, and then revoke it. But she cannot enforce a policy on Bob that requires removing prior rights from Bob, for that would violate Bob's security! Instead, as we see in the example above, acting as Lampson's "customer", Alice sets up an arena-Lampson's "controlled environment"-with initial conditions she determines, governed by her rules, and over which she is the sys-admin. If her rules can be enforced on uncontrolled subjects, she can admit Bob onto her arena as a player. If her rules require the players not to have some rights, she must set terms of entry. "Please leave your cellphones at the door." A prospective participant (the manufacturer) provides a player (calcFactory) to represent his interests within the arena, where this player can pass the security check at the gate (here, :Factory). No rights were taken away from anyone; participation was voluntary.
The arena technique corresponds to meta-linguistic abstraction-an arena is a virtual machine built within a virtual machine [Abelson86, Safra86] . The resulting system can be described according to either level of abstraction-by the rules of the base level object-capability system or by the rules of the arena. The subjects built by the admitted factories are also subjects within the arena. At the base level, we would say Q has permission to send messages to diodeWriter and authority to send integers to Bond. At the arena level of description, we would say a data diode is a primitive part of the arena's protection state, and say Q has permission to send integers to Bond. Any base level uncontrolled subjects admitted into the arena are devices of the arena-they have mysterious connections to the arena's external world.
When the only inputs to a problem are bits (here, code), any system capable of universal computation can solve any solvable problem, so questions of absolute possibility become useless. Conventional language comparisons face the same dilemma, and language designers have learned to ask instead an engineering question: Is this a good machine on which to build other machines? How well did we do on this supposedly impossible example? The code admitted was neither inspected nor transformed. Each arena level subject was also a base level subject. The behavior interposed by the customer between the subjects was very thin. Altogether, we mostly just reused the security properties of the base level object-capability system to build the security properties of our new arena level machine.
6.

Conclusion
Security in computational systems emerges from the interaction between primitive protection mechanisms and the behavior of trusted programs. To form a coherent understanding of access it is therefore necessary to extend our reasoning across the permissions/behavior boundary. Because of their restricted function, the required program analysis frequently proves tractable for security-enforcing programs, provided they are built on effective primitives. As we have shown here, such trusted programs are able to enforce restrictions on more general, untrusted programs by building on and abstracting more primitive protection mechanisms. To our knowledge, the object-capability model is the only protection model whose semantics can be readily expressed in programming language terms: lambda calculus with side effects. This provides the necessary common semantic framework for reasoning across the permissions/behavior boundary.
By extending our analysis to include the behavior of trusted programs, a critically missing paradigm for protection-abstraction-is restored to us. The effectiveness of the object-capability model in this framework is readily apparent. Perhaps more important, a semantic basis for extensible protection systems is established. We can, if we like, extend the space of security-enforcing programs to meet the security requirements of new object types, new applications, and new requirements-all of which are outside the scope of what can be described using the traditional access graph.
Analyses based on the evolution of protection state are conservative approximations. A successful verification demonstrating the enforcement of a policy using only the protection graph (as in [Shapiro00] ) is robust, in the sense that it does not rely on the cooperative behavior of programs. Verification failures are not robust -they may indicate a failure in the protection model, but they can also result from what might be called "failures of conservatism"-failures in which the policy is enforceable but the verification model has been simplified in a way that prevents successful verification. As we have shown by illustration here, several of the impossibility proofs concerning object capability systems may be seen as failures of conservatism.
Just as we should not expect a base programming language to provide us all the data types we need for computation, we should not expect a base access control system to provide us all the elements we need to express our security policies. Both issues deserve the same kind of answer: We use the base to build abstractions, extending the vocabulary we use to express our solutions. In evaluating a protection model, one must examine how well it supports the extension of its own expressiveness by use of abstraction.
In this paper, we have shown by example how object-capability practitioners set tight bounds on authority by building abstractions and reasoning about their behavior using conceptual tools similar to that used by object programmers to reason about any abstraction. We have shown, using only techniques easily implementable in Dennis and van Horn's 1966 Supervisor, how actual object-capability systems have used abstraction to solve problems that subsequent permission-only analyses have "proven" impossible for capabilities.
The object-capability paradigm, with its pervasive, fine-grained, and extensible support for the principle of least authority, enables mutually suspicious parties to cooperate more intimately while being less vulnerable to each other. When more cooperation may be practiced with less vulnerability, we may find we have a more cooperative world.
7.
